Apologetics: The Transcendental Argument (Part I)
Back in November, I started an irregular series on theist apologetics. Soon thereafter, I became distracted by the holidays (damn you O’Reilly), and I let this idea slip away. Now, on the unofficial end of the holiday season, it’s time to bring it back.
The Transcendental Argument, in a nutshell, tries to prove the existence of god by stating that some basic properties of the human experience can’t be explained any other way. It claims that logic, the laws of nature and morality can’t exist without god. I will deal with this in two parts because I have two different arguments. This first post will talk about logic and the laws of nature.
Before entering into an argument, one must accept the laws of logic. Otherwise, using logic to construct said argument is absurd. The transcendental theist apologist claims that we only have logic on which to rely because it was provided for us by god. In laying out this case, the apologist is accepting the validity of logic by trying to construct an argument. However, in stating that logic is the creation of god, it is implied that god would not be bound by logic. In other words, logic is contained within god instead of the other way around. Therefore, based on this assumption, it is impossible to prove the existence of god through logic. If god is bound by logic, and was preceded by it, then there is no need for him to explain its presence and necessity.
Similarly, in studying the universe, we must accept that there are laws of nature. Without that assumption, it is pointless to try to understand anything at all from a scientific perspective. The idea, here, is similar to the cosmological argument. It is an attempt to eliminate infinite regress. Each natural law is based on simpler principles. This implies that there must be a fundamental principle from which every law arises. That would be god. However, there are a few problems here. First of all, this “reducibility” is based on our scientific observations of nature. So, as with the logical argument, if we take the laws of nature as creations of god, then we can’t use them to make any kind of statements about him because he would not be bound thereby. However, if the laws of nature are bigger than god or bind him, then we have no need for him to explain them.
Furthermore, if we use laws of nature in any kind of argument about god, we accept that said laws exist. Scientific laws are laws. If there is an exception, then we have the laws wrong. So, if there are laws, then nothing can occur outside them. This precludes miracles. It takes god’s omnipotence and makes him no more powerful than any other particle in the universe. As with any given electron, he must follow the rules, and he is therefore impotent if he exists at all. Does that sound like a god to you?
So, that pretty much does it for two-thirds of the Transcendental Argument. The next part of this series will deal with the morality problem. Hopefully it won’t take a couple of months this time.
~I AM~
January 6th, 2006 at at 6:05 pm
I’ve never found the more ‘philosophical’ arguments for gods to lead to anything like what people actually seem to mean by the term in their own lives, and its use seems to me disingenuous at best. Saying that the universe requires a first cause or that natural law requires a fundamental law, even if accepted as valid, in no way leads to ‘therefore, god’ let alone ‘therefore, the particular brand of god I happen to buy’. I’ve often thought it’d be an interesting experiment to take such arguments and for each one, replace the ‘god’ conclusion with a different, random string; first cause -> ‘vrtmd’ exists, TAG -> ‘lxrfp’ exists – and then see if any actual identities could be established between these new terms that would say they described the same thing.
I see two main problems here. In the first place, statements such as “Eventually we must arrive at a comprehensive law of regularity of succession that has no further explanation in the operation of deeper physical laws. It can only be established by the conscious choice of a free moral agent.” from the Wikipedia article which I AM linked and which I think was originally Aquinas, seem to draw on an assumption that you can have a ‘free moral agent’ making choices without relying on any of the laws of nature. That is, you’re not proposing a mere dualism in which thought and so on are somehow independent of physical things, but you’re saying that you can have a god which is ‘a free moral agent’ capable of choice despite the non-existence of time or space, any natural law, any principle of logic, or even the truth of mathematics. Even if you think you can describe anything that can exist independently of all those things, I still don’t see how it could bear any resemblance to what we would call a mind, or a being, or an agent. (How something could be ‘moral’ if no natural law or logical principle dicated consequences of its actions – if it was indeed capable of action – is also beyond me).
Related to that then is the fact that we just don’t have a clear and consistent way of thinking or talking about these sorts of issues. Like the fact that there was no time ‘before’ the Big Bang, or various consequences of General Relativity for things like ’simultaneity’ which I won’t even try to describe for fear my head will implode, a question like why does the universe display order? simply cannot have an answer that we can intuitively understand. To some extent we need to alter our common-sense ideas of what mind, law, etc are; at the same time we need a willingness to admit when we don’t know something at an intuitive level, and accept that, at least provisionally, rather than resorting to god as a catch-all for ‘the incomprehensible’.
January 7th, 2006 at at 12:05 am
The “philosopher’s god” has always been the most intellectually defensible of all god-concepts. Of course, almost no one believes in the “philosopher’s god”, so it rarely seems to make that much of a difference.
January 7th, 2006 at at 1:12 am
Faith is a central tenet of xianity. Faith, where it may have meant loyalty when penned, has taken the meaning of “belief without – or contrary to – evidence” (thanks alot, Paul).
Apologetics, as an attempt to argue the existence of a god through logic and evidence, goes completely against the very concept of faith.
So, why in the world are xians continuously demonstrating how weak their faith is by attempting to prove their god? The funniest aspect is that, after all of their attempts to prove god running contrary to their theme of faith, when their arguments fall flat, what do they say? You’ve gotta have faith.
I had once pondered attacking apologetics, or at least presenting the arguments for and against god in an easily digestable way. I’ve had a lot of aspirations, lol. Right now it apparently takes an event to get me to post. Oh, well…I have some very substantial posts on the way, but in the meantime I’ll make do with commentary on current events (hint hint – I’ve posted).
January 7th, 2006 at at 3:12 am
The biggest problem I see with TAG is that it is meaningless to say that anything exists apart from the universe, since the universe (or, if you like, multiverse) includes everything that has ever existed or will exist. You can call the whole of existence whatever you like, but it does not change the fact that the creator of the universe must be part of it; to argue otherwise it to misunderstand what “universe” means. Thus, if the creator is not bound by logic, then neither is the universe. In fact, if you believe in such a supernatural creator who influences life, through miracles or whatever, then you admit that the universe is inherently flexible with respect to physical law and, hence, logic. And, if that is the case, then nothing makes sense and, yes, faith is all you have… that is, until you realize that even faith requires the allegedly unpredictable laws of logic, which, among other things, leaves faith in anything being no better or worse than faith in anything else.
January 7th, 2006 at at 3:59 pm
I Am,
Your argument against TAG is unconvincing. The first part of your argument you say,
”However, in stating that logic is the creation of god, it is implied that god would not be bound by logic. In other words, logic is contained within god instead of the other way around. Therefore, based on this assumption, it is impossible to prove the existence of god through logic. If god is bound by logic, and was preceded by it, then there is no need for him to explain its presence and necessity.”
You are misstating the argument. Logic is neither higher than God nor arbitrarily commanded by God. Logic is grounded in God’s eternal nature. God is necessarily a rational God.
*sigh* I am almost positive you will make this same mistake when you write about morality.
Secondly, Are you arguing for an *absolute* uniformity of nature? It’s not clear in your post.
January 7th, 2006 at at 4:24 pm
I call Euthyphro shenanigans. God is necessarily a rational God means what exactly? That whatever god does is rational? If he’s necessarily rational, then I take it he can’t do anything irrational.
So, how do we know if this is true?
Either we look at what god does, and see that it is rational, by some independent criteria – in which case we have an independent criteria of rationality that cannot be explained through resort to god. Or else we say that since god is doing it, it’s necessarily rational – in which case we have no way of knowing what’s rational or not, and it is indeed at god’s whim.
The statement that ‘god is necessarily a rational god’, like ‘god’s commands are necessarily good’, is not actually a third option in the dilemma. It is simply the starting point which the dilemma makes untenable, restated.
January 7th, 2006 at at 4:56 pm
Below is something that I wrote on Presuppositionalism (which is the method that uses TAG) a while back. At one time, I was a Christian and a presuppositionalist. The crux of my atheistic argument is the conventionality of both logic and morality. I find that this approach takes away TAG’s teeth.
***
Presuppositionalism is an apologetic that is very popular in reformed Christianity (i.e. Christianity that believes in sovereignty of God in salvation–predestination). They use what is called the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG). Presuppositionalists argue that the existence of universal laws of logic and morality only have meaning if God exists. Laws of logic and morality can only be justified by reference to a God that imposes those laws on the universe. An atheist who believes that the universe has no divine ruler, cannot say laws of logic and morality are universal because, in their view, the universe is a senseless entity that simply exists. Presuppositionalists ask the atheist, “How can you account for the existence of universal laws of logic and morality in a universe that came about by chance and does not hold inherent purpose?” The atheist, in this view, cannot answer this question, but the theist can. The theist can say that the universal laws of logic are based on God’s imposed universal rules, and the universal laws of morality are based on God’s character.
Once upon a time, I really appreciated this argument because it reversed the “burden of proof” that I discussed earlier. The atheist had to account for the existence of universal laws of logic and morality. Christianity is proven, not by a positive argument, but by the “impossibility of the contrary.” If an atheist attempted to appeal to universal laws of logic or morality (which is a necessary part of any debate), the atheist was accused of borrowing from a Christian worldview because it is the only worldview that adequately explains the existence of universal laws of logic and morality.
I repeatedly listened to Greg Bahnsen (one of the primary proponents of TAG) debate Gordon Stein and Edward Tabash. In his debate with Stein, Bahnsen concentrated on the universal laws of logic. With Tabash, he concentrated on universal morality. When Stein would say that a particular argument for the existence of God was illogical, Bahnsen would say something like, “Well, what is your foundation for logic?” Bahnsen asked Stein if he thought logic was universal or conventional. Bahsen said that if Stein says the laws are conventional that he is free to simply declare his victory over Stein and stop the debate without Stein having any recourse (because he presumably cannot say that Bahnsen is being universally illogical). He argued that if Stein did insist that the laws of logic were universal, he was only borrowing from a Christian worldview (that could account for universal laws) and was being inconsistent.
At one point in the Tabash debate, Tabash mentioned the immoral acts committed by Nazi Germany. Bahnsen went after his idea of immorality. He said that if atheism were true then Tabash had no business condemning an “immoral” act, because really the act was just one bag of biology doing something to another bag of biology and there could only be morality and immorality if a Christian God was imposing a moral order on the universe. [It was kind of tasteless because Tabash's parents were Holocaust survivors.]
Looking back at these debates, I still believe that Bahnsen won them. I don’t think either of the skeptics answered him very well. This is lamentable because I think there are some pretty good responses to Bahnsen’s (and other presuppositionalists’) questions.
The presuppositionalists wants the atheist to account for universal laws of logic. But what are the laws of logic? Are they really universal? Take, for instance, the law of non-contradiction. This law states that something cannot at once be itself and its opposition (if Q, then not not-Q). It would seem like a ridiculous argument for someone to say that this is not a universal law, that somewhere something can be itself and not itself at the same time. Here, the presuppositionalists say, “Aha, the laws of logic are universal and atheists cannot explain it in their materialist worldview!”
But this is where Wittgenstein’s philosophy is extremely helpful to the atheist. Wittgenstein believes that all language is based on rules. In order to communicate, one has to obey those rules. The rules, however, have no ultimate foundation, but are a consensus of people who wish to communicate. If one wishes to communicate, they must agree to play the same “game”–a language game. They must agree on common definitions of words that have no concrete relation to the things they signify.
The so-called “laws of logic,” then, are applicable because of the set “rules of language.” There is nothing mystical about it. Someone is logical as long as they follow the rules for debate as part of the rules of language. Someone is illogical if they break those rules. The “rules of language” are conventional (i.e. they are unspoken rules of “proper” discourse), so the laws of logic are conventional insofar as they are based on conventional language. The laws of logic only appear universal because they are unbreakable as long as someone is following the rules of language. There can never be a case where one can say that someone is something and its opposition at the same time as long as this conversation is following the rules of language.
Take the law of non-contradiction. The law depends on one’s definition of the words ‘if,’ ‘then,’ and ‘not’. People playing the same language game will define these words similarly. They can only communicate as long as they agree to the same rules. If one of them stops following the rule, however, communication breaks down. There is no ultimate foundation for these rules, though, and one can only respond, “No, you are not following the rules!” to which his or her opponent can say, “Yes, I am, but you are not!” The rule, however, cannot be proven, only followed. So, can someone deny the law of non-contradiction? Certainly, they can and people do all the time. Because this game is so widely accepted, though, societies commit these people to asylums and consider them “mad.”
So, I think Stein would have made a better argument if he had simply told Bahnsen that he thought the laws of logic were not universal but were valid insofar as they both agreed to play the same language game. As long as they were playing by the same game, they could use the laws consistently. True, there is nothing stopping Bahnsen from standing up and declaring himself the winner because the laws of logic are conventional, but his act would not have very much support from the audience because it breaks the rules of the language game that most of them agree to “play.”
I believe that there are no truly universal laws of logic, because a “law of logic” is a part of a language game and this language game is not universal, but conventional. I believe you can use the laws of logic in absolutist terms, however, when two people agree to play the same language game. These laws can be appealed to, not because they are universal, but rather because the participants in the conversation have agreed to follow the same rules.
Edward Tabash could have taken an approach similar to the one I suggested that Stein should have taken regarding the laws of logic. Tabash could have simply agreed that moral laws were conventional. Bahnsen stated that if he admitted that, however, then he could simply pick up a gun and shoot Tabash and declare himself a winner (Bahnsen was kind of an asshole). He said that Tabash would object to this, though, because he would perceive it to be immoral, but according to Bahnsen, immorality only makes sense if moral law was universal.
It could be argued, however, that morality is itself only another language game. Something is moral or immoral depending on the consensual rules of people involved in speaking in these terms. Societies formulate the language in which morality and immorality can be discussed. Whether something is moral or immoral depends on how the language is constructed. So, while Bahnsen could stand up and shoot Tabash in the head and declare himself the winner of the debate, he would be violating the rules of moral discourse accepted by the majority of the people in the audience and his opponent. Bahnsen would be considered “insane” for refusing to follow the rules of moral language accepted by his society.
January 7th, 2006 at at 5:33 pm
God could not do anything irrational because it would violate his nature. For example, he cannot make a square circle. This is why I say God is necessarily rational, because we can not possibly picture a universe with logical contradictions.
Because it’s rational. If you want to call Euthyphro shenanigans on my objection, then you will have to demonstrate that logic cannot be an essential part of Gods character. Besides, you have failed to justify, or ground some independent criteria for logical evaluation. Moreover, you will as likely be guilty of using logic to prove logic—inevitably. Perhaps you should try and turn the dilemma on yourself and see what happens. In defense, I can only defend reason by using reason. If I cannot dichotomize this from God, then in a sense circularity will be unavoidable (but now I am starting to ramble because I am in a hurry).
Wes,
I have not read you post yet (only Morgan’s)
January 7th, 2006 at at 6:07 pm
Wes,
Using logic to reject logic? To deny or try to disprove the need for, necessity of, or truth of logic one must first utilize it, thus disproving your original assertion. If you must use logic in the effort to refute it, then the argument is self-evidently not true. You only proven its truthfulness or applicability (ironically in the very attempt to refute it).Tell me, does the conclusion follow logically from your argument, or did you reject TAG because it’s logically incoherent? Language is not deterministic of logic. 2+2=4 no matter what language, or what planet you’re from.
January 7th, 2006 at at 6:48 pm
So a square circle can’t exist because it’s irrational and inconceivable. God couldn’t make a square circle in defiance of these facts. Therefore, god is bound by what is rational and conceivable. In what way then does the existence of rationality point to his existence? That’s like saying, “A pink elephant would be subject to gravity; gravity exists; therefore, there must be pink elephants”. I fail to see how stating that rationality “is part of god’s nature” changes the dilemma. Either that means that he is bound by rational standards, or he is not, and we simply call his deeds rational.
Look, I’m not saying that the question of how we can assert universal logical or moral laws is not problematic. However, I cannot see that the TAG solves that problem. It seems to me to amount to begging the question – there are universal laws of logic because there is a god; right, so how does the existence of god allow universal laws of logic? It seems to me that either this is simply asserted to work, or god is defined in such a way as to be the universal laws of logic, which adds nothing to our understanding. If you “cannot dichotomize [reason] from god”, then that sounds like reason and god are identical, and saying “reason exists through god” is meaningless.
January 7th, 2006 at at 7:01 pm
Logic is grounded in God’s eternal nature. God is necessarily a rational God.
*sigh* I am almost positive you will make this same mistake when you write about morality.
Secondly, Are you arguing for an *absolute* uniformity of nature? It’s not clear in your post.
WOW where did you ever get that woundrous insight into the nature of god and why is you view any better than I Am’s or mine or the guy who fixed my window.
January 7th, 2006 at at 7:41 pm
God is bound by his own nature; you are trying to put a spin on TAG and separate the basic presuppositions to make them either superior of arbitrary from God. I offered the solution to the objection and you ignored it.
In addition, Morgan, you are misreading my objection to I AM’s rebuttal of TAG and making it the TAG argument. My objection shows that I AM objection is insufficient—Get it??? Given the most fundamental assumptions about reality that the atheist “HAS” he now should reflect on those basic presuppositions and he will realize that given his presuppositions science, logic, and morality would be “impossible”. Neither you or I am have demonstrated this—the only option you have is to dismiss the basic presuppositions of logic, morality etc.. like bleedingissac.
For further exemplars on transcendental arguments—In general, transcendental arguments take the form (1) If possibly N, then X; (2) possibly N; (3) therefore X where N is some general noetic state or operation and X is some purported precondition of N (typically either ontological or conceptual). Plug in ‘knowledge’ for N and ‘Christian theism’ for X.
Or,
I have seen it put this way if it helps you perceive the argument better:
Ts, this is the standard Christian standpoint on this issue. Moreover, it is not a matter of being better than I AM’s or the guy who installed your window—but who has the best explanation. I‘m sure that neither you, I AM, nor anyone else cares to beat up straw men. So if you are going to argue against some ones position—Get it right! Capiche?
This is starting to get boring, so you can have the last word.
Good Day.
January 7th, 2006 at at 8:42 pm
Wes,
Using logic to reject logic? To deny or try to disprove the need for, necessity of, or truth of logic one must first utilize it, thus disproving your original assertion. If you must use logic in the effort to refute it, then the argument is self-evidently not true.
BF,
Where did I say that I was trying to “reject logic”? I neither reject it nor am I attempting to “refute it.” I believe logic (or, more appropriately, “logics”) exists. What I am saying is that what makes something logical is its adherence to grammatical rules and semantic definitions, not some mystical connection with a non-material law.
Who says? Isn’t there a difference between Eastern and Western logic? Why is that? Is it possibly because our languages differ so dramatically.
I’m not saying anything more than the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (i.e. that the language we speak affects how we view the world).
Come on, this is Semiotics 101. “2″ is a symbol as is “+,” “=,” and “4.” If on another planet the symbol “2″ means what we call “meatloaf,” you aren’t going to get close to your mathematical answer.
If, however, you are saying that 2+2=4 wherever it is agreed that these symbols mean what we think them to mean, then you are making my point for me. The truth (or, logical validity) of the statement 2+2=4 is dependent on a language’s understanding of the symbols.
The same is true of all “laws of logic.” These laws are necessary because of the definitions we give to certain words. The words that have shaped Western logic are the connectives (e.g. and, or, if . . . then, neither . . . nor, etc.).
The “law” of non-contradiction (If Q, then not not-Q), for example, turns on our defintions of the words “If,” “then,” and “not.” The definitions determine the laws, and there is nothing universal about the meanings we give words.
January 7th, 2006 at at 9:24 pm
The gist of presuppositionalism seems to be that if we assume you need god to assert universality, then the fact that we want to assert universality will lead us to need god. This is trivially true and fantastically pointless. At no point do I see a description of how admitting god does allow us to assert universally true logic or the like. BF, I’m sorry if this seems tiresome to you, but your argument to me really does sound like “If you don’t wear a hat, you can’t consistently assert that logic is universal. I am wearing a hat, and thus I can so assert.”
So your assertion is that we can say logic and morality are universal because god exists, since god is by nature logical and moral. But devising an entity that is logical and moral “by nature” doesn’t tell us how logic and morality can be universal. I don’t understand your reference to “separate the basic presuppositions” at all. Like I said, if you presuppose that anything is necessary to allow an assertion, then in making that assertion you must acknowledge the thing; but that tells us nothing about whether the supposition is justified. And I don’t recall ignoring any solutions – just rephrasings of the problem.
And what makes Christianity so special in this regard? Why is Christianity a valid basis for morality, science and logic where not only atheism but Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism etc are not? This is the worst example of philosopher’s god syndrome I’ve ever seen, going from the assertion that a completely undefined entity of purest spun handwavium is necessary to solve a problem in a way that is never described, to identifying this entity with a particular religion/tradition/sect/church with no work shown.
January 8th, 2006 at at 5:27 am
If not not X, then X.
This is the gist of a transcendental argument. While, at first glance, this may seem to be common sense, upon any further inspection we can see how preposterous this argument can be.
The presuppositionalist supplants God for X. We atheists like to point out that anything can be represented by X, no matter how factual, theoretical, or downright make-believe, and we do so frequently (e.g. leprechauns, tooth fairies, invisible pink unicorns, flying spaghetti monsters). True, it is indeed impossible to prove, absolutely, that something – anything – does not exist (one would have to be everywhere, in every possible situation, throughout all of existence, past, present, and future, simultaneously to do so). In light of this, it is safe to throw absolutes out the window and go by evidence and make a best guess.
Previous commentors illustrated this beautifully. Why the xian god? Why not Allah, or YHWH, or Mithra, or Neptune, or the magical goat phallus in the dishwasher that I choose to worship (not really, just trying to make a point – I don’t have a dishwasher)? Why a god at all? Why not a hat?
Presuppositionalists come across as nothing more than spoiled brats pretending to be intellectual. At least IMHO.
January 8th, 2006 at at 5:28 am
BTW, Morgan, you have impressed me here.
bleedingissac – very well thought out and presented.
January 8th, 2006 at at 1:42 pm
If the transcendental argument were expressed formally, wouldn’t it be something like:
P v Q
~ P
/ Q
Where “P” is atheistic materialism and “Q” is Christian theism.
[Sans the symbols, this is P or Q, not P, therefore Q. Informally, "Either atheistic materialism is true or Christian theism is true. Atheistic materialism is not true, therefore Christian theism is true."]
The argument is formally valid, but “valid” does not mean “true” (e.g. “All trucks are blue; John has a truck; John’s truck is blue.” is technically valid, but false).
The Christian presuppostionalist starts by a strict dichotomy. Either atheistic materialism is true or Christian theism is true (the “P” can be changed according to the debate partner; it could be that “P” is Islam, etc. It is only important that the “P” is the oppositions position.).
To make their case, not-P (when “P” is atheistic materialism), they appeal to supposedly immaterial, universal laws of logic and morality. They argue that it would not make sense if a universe that began entirely by chance was governed by immaterial, universal laws. If the atheist cannot account for those rules, then Christian theism is a better alternative because it can explain why universal, immaterial laws would govern the universe–i.e. God put them there.
Formally, the case for not-P would be:
~ (x . P)
(Ex)
/ ~P
Where “x” is immaterial, universal laws of logic and “P” is atheistic materialism.
[Sans the symbols, it is not the case that x exists and P exists simultaneously, x exists, therefore P does not exist. Informally, "Immaterial, universal laws of logic cannot exist if atheistic materialism is true. Immaterial, universal laws of logic exists, therefore atheistic materialism cannot be true.]
This argument, too, is technically valid, but equally false.
Obviously, this is a swiss cheese argument in which an opponent is free to choose which hole to walk (or drive a truck) through.
Morgan discusses an obvious one. Saying “god is responsible” is no answer at all. One might as well put any other term in that spot (e.g. the Flying Spaghetti Monster). It is only because we have heard this term “god” so much that we don’t immediately fall into hysterical laughter like we would if someone suggested magical, invisible elves are responsible for universal laws of logic.
Another point is that this is a kind of “god of the gaps” argument that we see especially pronounced in cosmological (and intelligent design) arguments. It is assumed that just because someone may not currently know how there could be immaterial, universal laws of logic within a universe begun and governed by chance, that there can never be an explanation for this. It could be, however, that we could discover something about the universe itself that dictates immaterial, universal laws of logic without reference to a god at all.
There is also my point that it may not be the case that there are immaterial, universal laws of logic. Instead, laws of logic may simply be a biproduct of the definitions we give certain words like “if,” “then,” “and,” “or,” “but,” “not,” etc. Our logic would certainly appear universal, because we can only think in terms of the language we know, but would not necessarily be so. “Logic” is merely following our grammatic and semantic rules of language.
If logic is only a biproduct of our language (which explains why Eastern and Western logic is so divergent), then there is an atheistic, materialist account of (seemingly) universal laws of logic. The transcendental argument fails, then because it does not demonstrate the “impossibility of the contrary” (i.e. it does not demonstrate (Ex) (that immaterial, universal laws of logic exist) so it also fails to demonstrate ~ P (that atheistic materialism is not true)).
This argument was only ever effective because it caught people off-guard. Debaters had come to discuss the merits of theistic arguments and were, often, not prepared to justify their use of reason (which is normally assumed in a debate). Now that people have had time to investigate TAG, fewer people have trouble with it.
January 8th, 2006 at at 1:55 pm
If anyone is interested, I once wrote a satire of a reformed person’s argument for believing in a god. It does not spell out the presuppositional argument directly, but it assumes the mindset of those who use it.
I use reformed theology to argue for the existence of Shit Fairies.
January 8th, 2006 at at 9:39 pm
I don’t at all understand the “argument” raised against my reasoning, but I’ve been wowed reading through the replies. Morgan and bleedingisaac, bravo. You people have to be careful. If I decide that all of my (atheist) readers are smarter than I am, I’ll stop writing.
“a completely undefined entity of purest spun handwavium”
That’s my favorite phrase ever.
January 9th, 2006 at at 5:55 pm
I also enjoyed my earlier, completely ignored comment.
January 22nd, 2008 at at 5:02 pm
bankruptcy making payments…
colonizers:sarcastic rot:vaguest monadic …